Persuasion under costly learning
WebWe consider a Bayesian persuasion model extended to a receiver’s endogenous acquisition of information under an entropy-based cost commonly used in rational inattention. A sender’s opti-mal signal can be computed from standard Bayesian persuasion subject to an additional constraint: the receiver never gathers her own costly information. Web17. júl 2024 · Specifically, we formulate the bounded rationality of an agent by adopting the quantal response model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). We develop a theory of rationality-robust information design in the canonical setting of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) with binary receiver action. We first identify conditions under which the ...
Persuasion under costly learning
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WebPersuasion under costly learning. A Sender (seller) tries to persuade a rationally inattentive Receiver (buyer) to take a particular action (e.g., buying). Learning is costly for the Receiver who can choose to process strictly less information than what the sender provides. In a binary-action binary-state model, we show that optimal disclosure ... WebWe consider a Bayesian persuasion model extended to a receiver’s endogenous acquisition of information under an entropy-based cost commonly used in rational inattention. A …
Web1. aug 1982 · Persuasion under costly learning Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 94, 2024, Article 102451 Show abstract Research article Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 104, 2024, pp. 666-673 Show abstract Research article Testing, disclosure and approval WebLearning is costly for the Receiver who can choose to process strictly less information than what the sender provides. In a binary-action binary-state model, we show that optimal disclosure involves information distortion, but to a lesser extent than the case without learning costs; meanwhile, the Receiver processes less information than what ...
WebBayesian persuasion to a receiver’s acquisition of costly information. The game can be solved as a standard Bayesian persuasion under an additional constraint: the receiver never learns. The ‘threat’ of learning hurts the sender. However, the outcome can also be worse for the receiver, in which case the Web31. mar 2024 · Persuasion under costly learning Article Dec 2024 J MATH ECON Dong Wei View Show abstract Information Acquisition and Welfare in Network Games Article Jun 2024 Christian Matthew Leister View Show...
Webpersuasion and on costly information acquisition. We extend the standard Bayesian persuasion model to consider an endogenously privately informed receiver. 2. Our model …
Web1. dec 2024 · Persuasion under costly learning December 2024 Authors: Dong Wei Abstract A Sender (seller) tries to persuade a rationally inattentive Receiver (buyer) to take a … distance from greensboro to walkertownWeb2. mar 2024 · We study a sender’s optimal choice of precision when he selects from a class of random signals to persuade a receiver to accept his request, with higher costs associated with higher precision. The receiver observes both the precision and a … cpt closure of tracheocutaneous fistuladistance from greensboro nc to phoenix azWebPersuasion Under Costly Learning In document Essays in Dynamic Games and Information Economics. Dong Wei. A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the. requirements for the degree of (Page 46-51) 3.1 Introduction. Learning or information processing can be costly. Due to such costs, a decision maker may not want to take in all ... cptcnews1 gmail.comWeb1. apr 2024 · In this paper, we study a variant of a Bayesian persuasion model with the innovation that new information is transmitted to the Receiver by the Sender through … cpt closure of woundWebPersuasion under costly learning A Sender (seller) tries to persuade a rationally inattentive Receiver (buyer) to take a particular action (e.g., buying). Learning is costly for the … cpt coach appWeb12. jún 2024 · A Sender (seller) tries to persuade a rationally inattentive Receiver (buyer) to take a particular action (e.g., buying). Learning is costly for the Receiver who can choose … cpt coach 2.0